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Abstract. Definitive diagnosis of malaria requires the demonstration through 
laboratory tests of the presence within the patient of malaria parasites or their 
components. Since malaria parasites can be present even in the absence of 
malaria manifestations, and since symptoms of malaria can be manifested even 
in the absence of malaria parasites, malaria diagnosis raises important issues for 
the adequate understanding of disease, etiology and diagnosis. One approach to 
the resolution of these issues adopts a realist view, according to which the 
needed clarifications will be derived from a careful representation of the entities 
on the side of the patient which form the ultimate truthmakers for clinical 
statements. We here address a challenge to this realist approach relating to the 
diagnosis of malaria, and show how this challenge can be resolved by appeal to 
Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) and to the Ontology for General Medical 
Science (OGMS) constructed in its terms. 
Keywords: malaria, Ontology of General Medical Science 
1   Introduction 
Malaria is a disease caused by one of four types of Plasmodium usually transmitted to 
humans by the bite of an infected female Anopheles mosquito that previously sucked 
the blood from a person with malaria.1 When a patient is or has been in a country in 
which malaria is prevalent, the disease can be suspected on the basis of both 
symptoms reported by the patient (such as body aches, headache and general malaise) 
and physical findings detected at examination (such as severe chills, high fever, and 
prostration). However, for a definitive diagnosis to be made, laboratory tests must 
demonstrate the presence within the patient of malaria parasites or their components.2 
The parasite life cycle (Figure 1) starts in the human host when Plasmodium 
sporozoites enter the bloodstream after being transmitted via a mosquito bite. From 
there, the sporozoites infect the liver cells and disappear from the bloodstream within 
approximately 30 minutes.   
The sporozoites mature into schizonts, which rupture and release merozoites into 
the blood circulation, where they infect red blood cells. They further undergo asexual 
multiplication: some merozoites mature again into schizonts that lead to more 
merozoites; others differentiate into gametocytes which, when picked up by a second 
mosquito during a further bite, undergo a series of transformations in this second 
mosquito, leading eventually to the production of new sporozoites that can infect 
another human being. Two types of Plasmodium – P. ovale and P. vivax – can persist 
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in the liver of an infected patient and cause relapses by invading the bloodstream 
weeks, or even years, later. 
In some regions people are infected but not made ill by the parasites. This can be 
so even if the patient manifests symptoms of malaria, which are after all quite 
unspecific. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) ‘such 
carriers have developed just enough immunity to protect them from malarial illness 
but not from malarial infection. In that situation, finding malaria parasites in an ill 
person does not necessarily mean that the illness is caused by the parasites’2 
(emphasis added).  
Finally, it is known that patients with sickle cell trait, i.e. people who inherited one 
sickle cell gene and one normal gene, have a reduced likelihood of dying from 
malaria because the replication cycle of the parasite is hampered by this condition: 
infected red blood cells become sickle-shaped and are for this reason destroyed in the 
spleen along with the associated parasite. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Life cycle of Plasmodium parasites2 
2  Background 
Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)3 is an upper ontology that is intended to provide a 
logically well-structured set of highly general representational units for common use 
across multiple scientific and clinical specialisms. BFO is the foundation for the OBO 
Foundry ontologies4 and for a large variety of other domain ontologies, especially 
within the biomedical sphere (http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/users).  
BFO is designed to serve semantic interoperability of multiple data resources. It is 
built on a realist basis, which means that it is intended to represent exclusively types 
26
of entities that exist in reality, including information entities such as databases or 
clinical charts, as well as disease entities such as malaria or influenza. BFO’s 
approach thus differs from those approaches which rest on information modeling and 
which are said to be ‘concept based’ or ‘object oriented’. Because of important 
distinctions between the realist and concept-based paradigms, including differences in 
terminology, communication between the groups on either side is not easy. Thus it 
has been stated that ‘BFO has shortcomings for representing medical information at 
the granular level. Like many philosophy based upper ontologies, it suffers from 
defining accidental properties when they are not. This leads to issues in maturation of 
organisms through development cycles such as parasites go through and leads to 
erroneous classifications’.5  
In response, it must be pointed out that BFO does not use the term ‘property’ since 
this term (like its sister terms ‘class’ and ‘concept’) is subject to too large a variety of 
competing interpretations. This does not however mean that one cannot give a 
definition using the resources of BFO for what is meant by ‘property’ (or by 
‘accidental property’) as these terms are used in specific contexts. It also does not 
mean that BFO is for some reason unable to do justice to scenarios involving complex 
temporal relations between multiple disease-causing processes of the sort 
exemplified, for example, in the case of malaria.  
To test the validity of this latter claim, a challenge was proposed to determine 
whether BFO is capable of representing a scenario under which John, a person on 
rotation living in the Congo, has a blood test drawn that shows sporozoites on the 
smear, in such a way as to be able to answer the following questions: 
 
1. Does John have malaria when there are sporozoites detected on his blood smear?5  
2. How can BFO be used to classify an immature life form as a cause of a disease 
when the causative agent develops internally to the organism and changes its 
stage of life? 
3   Objectives 
Our purpose in addressing this challenge is (a) to document the sorts of 
misunderstandings that advocates of the concept orientation have manifested in their 
approaches to BFO, (b) to highlight the kinds of questions that BFO-users have to ask 
themselves when analyzing real-life problems, and (c) to demonstrate the benefits of 
the realist approach as a robust means of providing upper-level categories in whose 
terms diverse representations of complex clinical scenarios can be analyzed and 
compared.  
4 Methods 
We based our analysis on definitions (Table 1) from the on-line version of the 
Stedman Medical Dictionary1 and from the web pages on malaria maintained by the 
CDC,2 including http://www.cdc.gov/Malaria. We used the BFO-based Ontology of 
General Medical Science6 (Table 2), formal relationships defined in the Relation 
Ontology7 and additional upper ontology representational units taken from BFO3. 
Important here are the distinctions between (1) universals and particulars, for 
instance HUMAN BEING versus John, (2) continuants and occurrents, for instance 
sporozoites versus the transformations they undergo through time, (3) first-order 
entities on the side of the patient and those information entities which are about such 
first-order entities, for instance John’s disease versus some diagnosis made about that 
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disease, (4) qualities and dispositions, for instance an organism’s temperature or mass 
versus its potential to undergo certain processes when trigger conditions are satisfied, 
and (5) diseases and those predispositions to disease which belong to a wider group 
of what are known as ‘risk factors’. These distinctions imply an analysis according to 
which the question Does John have malaria when there are sporozoites detected on 
his blood smear? in fact amounts to three questions:  
 
(1) What is denoted by the term ‘malaria’?  
(2) Does John have what is called ‘malaria’ in the specified scenario? 
(3) What is required to allow a correct diagnosis of what is called ‘malaria’?  
 
Table 1: Malaria-related definitions from Stedman and CDC 
Malaria (D1 – Stedman): a disease caused by the presence of the sporozoan 
Plasmodium in the erythrocyte phase […] characterized by episodic severe chills and 
high fever, prostration, and occasionally death or immunologically mediated 
sequelae 
Malaria (D2 – CDC): a serious and sometimes fatal disease caused by Plasmodium 
falciparum, P. vivax, P. ovale, or P. malariae. People who get malaria are typically 
very sick with high fevers, shaking chills, and flu-like illness. 
Disease (D3 – Stedman): an interruption, cessation, or disorder of body function, 
system, or organ. 
Disease (D4 – Stedman): a morbid entity characterized usually by at least two of 
these criteria: recognized etiologic agent(s), identifiable group of signs and 
symptoms, or consistent anatomic alterations. 
Disorder (D5 – Stedman): a disturbance of function, structure, or both, resulting 
from a genetic or embryonic failure in development or from exogenous factors such 
as poison, trauma, or disease. 
5   Results 
There are multiple definitions for ‘malaria’ and ‘disease’ in Table 1 above, and this 
multiplicity is compounded further if other traditional terminologies such as 
SNOMED CT are added into the mix. How, then, can we reconcile the differences 
which arise when clinical data are collected on the basis of such conflicting 
definitions, given that the underlying concepts employed are so diverse? 
BFO is designed to provide an answer to this question by providing a common 
basis for analysis that can be accepted by all of the multiple specialist communities 
involved. 
The results of our analysis of the mentioned scenario are presented in Table 3, 
whose columns contain indices for easy reference in the discussion that follows, a 
unique identifier (ID) for the particular entities in reality to which reference is made, a 
description of each such entity in the terms set forth above and of the relations in 
which it stands to other entities, and also specifications of timeframes during which 
these relationships hold. We assumed in this table that a complete malaria cycle is 
realized in John; deviations from this canonical case are discussed below.  
A number of simplifications are made for reasons of space. Thus we gloss over the 
relationships that obtain between groups and members of those groups, for example 
between individual sporozoites and the groups they form, and also over the distinction 
between an organism such as John and the whole formed by John together with 
associated entities – for example sporozoites – in his interior.   
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Table 2: Disease-related definitions extracted from the BFO-based Ontology of General 
Medical Science (OGMS) 
Disease (D6): a disposition (i) to undergo pathological processes that (ii) exists in an 
organism because of one or more disorders in that organism. 
Disease Course (D7): the totality of all processes through which a given disease 
instance is realized. 
Disorder (D8): a combination of physical components of or in an organism that is 
clinically abnormal. 
Manifestation of a Disease (D9): a bodily feature of a patient that is (i) a deviation 
from clinical normality that exists in virtue of the realization of a disease and (ii) is 
observable. 
Pathological Process (D10): a bodily process that is clinically abnormal [which is 
what OGMS says; and which I prefer; let me know if this causes you problems]. 
Predisposition to Disease of Type X (D11): a disposition in an organism that 
constitutes an increased risk of the organism’s subsequently developing disease X. 
Diagnosis (D12): a conclusion of an interpretive process that has as input a clinical 
picture of a given patient and as output an assertion to the effect that the patient has a 
disease of such and such a type. 
Table 3: Simplified representation of John’s disease history from infection until his first 
malarial attack 
 Ref ID Description Relations Time 
1 #1 John inst-of HUMAN BEING  t1-t7 
2 #2 John’s history inst-of OCCURRENT  
3   has-participant #1 t1-t7 
4 #3 sporozoites in John’s blood inst-of BONA FIDE GROUP  t2-t3 
5   part-of #1 t2-t3 
6   inst-of DISORDER t2-t3 
7 #4 disposition to harm John’s liver cells inst-of DISPOSITION t2-t3 
8   has-bearer #3  t2 
9 #5 portion of John’s blood on a blood 
smear  
part-of #1  t2-t3 
10 #6 sporozoites in John’s blood smear inst-of BONA FIDE GROUP t4-t7 
11   part-of #5 t4-t7 
12   part-of #3  t2-t3 
13 #7 schizonts in John’s liver part-of #1 t5 
14   derives-from #3 t5 
15 #8 process in which #7 participates inst-of PATHOLOGICAL  PROCESS  
16   realization-of #4 t5 
17   has-participant #7 t5 
18 #9 disposition to harm John’s blood 
cells 
inst-of DISPOSITION t5-t7 
19   has-bearer #7 t5 
20 #10 mature Plasmodia life forms in 
John’s blood 
part-of #1 t6-t7 
21   derives-from #7 t6 
22   participates-in #2 t6-t7 
23 #11 disposition to cause pathological 
processes characteristic of malaria  
inst-of DISEASE t6-t7 
24   has-bearer #10 t6 
25 #12 clinical manifestations of which 
John is the bearer 
part-of #2  t7 
26 #13 clinical manifestations of John’s 
malaria 
part-of #12  
27   realization-of #11 t7 
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6   Discussion 
The purpose of the analysis presented here is to demonstrate the power of the realist 
approach in representing reality, including those parts of reality that can not, for 
whatever reason, be directly observed. The issued challenge involves a concrete 
example of entities of this sort. Sporozoites in the blood are very shortlived; they 
disappear within 30 minutes. Also, due to the very small numbers involved – malaria 
can be caused even by one sporozoite – sporozoites are almost impossible to detect in 
the blood. They therefore play no de facto role in the diagnostic process (and 
diagnosis) of malaria because this diagnosis is only considered after the first or 
second bout of fever, which occurs days after the infectious mosquito bite and thus 
certainly not within 30 minutes. One of the elements crucial to the process of 
accepting malaria as a diagnosis for the disease underlying the manifestations is 
indeed the recurrence of fever attacks the first of which initiates the phase of 
clinically observable manifestations of the disease. It is these recurring fevers that 
routinely lead doctors to either diagnose a condition as malaria or initiate the relevant 
diagnostic procedures. Thus, although the question ‘Does John have malaria when 
there are sporozoites detected on his blood smear?’ does not make much sense in 
light of currently available diagnostic techniques, it still poses interesting problems 
from an ontological perspective. And for sure, the related question ‘Does John have 
malaria when there are sporozoites in his blood?’ is still an important question to 
address, since it helps us to guard against a widespread assumption according to 
which presence of disease and diagnosis of disease can be taken to be the same thing. 
That they are different is demonstrated most clearly by the common occurrence of 
patient records containing multiple diagnoses for what, in course of time, proves to be 
a single disease. To the best of our knowledge, however, there is to date no electronic 
health record system that allows the structured documentation not only of diagnoses, 
but also of what, on the side of the patient, these diagnoses are about.  
Following OGMS, to assert that something is clinically abnormal is to state (1) that 
it is not part of the life plan for an organism of the relevant type (unlike, say, aging or 
pregnancy), (2) that it is causally linked to an elevated risk of pain or other feelings of 
illness or of death or dysfunction on the part of the organism, and (3) that it is such 
that this elevated risk exceeds a certain threshold level.6,8 
Taken together with D8 in Table 2, this implies that the sporozoites found in 
John’s blood smear (#5) provide partial evidence for the presence of a disorder in 
John. First, physical components of this sort satisfy two of the three criteria for 
clinical abnormality: presence of sporozoites does not belong to the life plan of a 
human being, and it is causally linked to an elevated risk of death and dysfunction. 
However, on the basis of the information provided, no inference can be drawn as to 
whether the third criterion is also satisfied: for if, per accidens, all sporozoites that 
were in John’s body prior to the blood tap end up on the smear, then there is no longer 
any risk related to these sporozoites. In that case, there would be no entities to which 
#7 – #11 and #13 in Table 3 would correspond. If, however, there are further 
sporozoites in that patient’s body, then John has what OGMS refers to as a disorder. 
The second question is whether John, at that point, has a disease as perceived 
under the OGMS framework, and if so what entity that disease would be. The 
determining factor, following D6, is whether or not the given sporozoites dispose or 
predispose to pathological processes (D10), i.e. processes that either are changes in 
the way a normal physiological function is realized (e.g. hyperventilation) or have no 
physiological counterpart at all (e.g. inflammation). Clearly, this question, too, can be 
answered positively: the sporozoites penetrate liver cells as a result of which the 
generation of merozoites then starts: these processes have no human physiological 
counterpart and are thus pathological. The disorder in question is thus the bearer of a 
disposition to pathological processes, which means, in OGMS terms, that it is the 
bearer of a disease. 
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The third question is whether the disease in question is what is standardly called 
‘malaria’. Here the answer is less straightforward, and this for a number of reasons. 
The first is that authoritative medical sources are vague about what it is for something 
to be a disease of this or that sort, as contrasted with what it is for a person to have a 
disease. Often these sources characterize a disease as being an illness, sickness, 
pathological condition, morbid entity, and so forth, whereby these terms themselves 
are either not further defined, or, if they are defined, then in a way which leads to 
circularity or inconsistencies when the provided definitions are combined. We could 
not find a definition for disease to which the CDC adheres consistently in its 
treatment of malaria, and the definitions in Stedman (D3 – D5) suffer from analogous 
shortcomings. 
On the proposed OGMS definition, a disease is a disposition to pathological 
processes inhering in a disorder of some specific sort – for instance involving a 
necrotic liver or a chromosome with abnormal mHTT. The disorder provides the 
physical basis of the disease and it also provides the differentia by which diseases of 
different types are, from the realist perspective, distinguished from each other. This 
realist treatment of disease regards manifest symptoms and pathological processes as 
being, in a sense, epiphenomena. The disease (i.e. the disposition) can still exist even 
if, for whatever reason, it is not realized in any overt way. Clearly, however, appeals 
to manifest symptoms and pathological processes will still be needed for diagnostic 
(epistemological) purposes, since for many diseases we still have very little 
knowledge of the nature of the disorder which forms their physical basis.  
Providing an answer to our third question, now, is less than straightforward against 
this background because there are, in the described scenario, three distinct 
dispositions that may qualify as diseases: #4, the disposition to harm John’s liver 
cells, #9, the disposition to harm John’s blood cells, and #11, the disposition in John 
to develop clinical manifestations caused by the presence of mature Plasmodia in his 
blood cells. The CDC states that ‘the blood stage parasites are responsible for the 
clinical manifestations of the disease [of malaria]’, these manifestations being, for 
instance, elevated temperature, perspiration, weakness, enlargement of the liver, 
increased respiratory rate, and so forth. This, together with D2, leads us to conclude 
that it is #11 that would be qualified by the CDC as John’s malaria, though there is 
some evidence that #13 might also be so identified – though this, from the OGMS 
perspective, would amount to a confusion of a disease with the corresponding disease 
course or series of symptoms. D1 and D4 together lead us to conclude that for 
Stedman, too, either #11 or #13 would qualify as the disease called ‘malaria’. 
However, on combining D3 with D5, we see that #4, #8, and #9 would also qualify as 
‘diseases’ for Stedman, although not as ‘malaria’ (because of D1’s explicit reference 
to the erythrocyte phase). 
Similar analyses can now be provided for the non-canonical scenarios regarding 
the unfolding of the parasite’s life cycle. For those malarial forms in which parasites 
survive in the liver, the relationships 13, 14, 16, 17 and 19 extend beyond the period 
labeled ‘t5’. For patients with sickle-cell trait or with acquired immunity for malaria 
the analysis is as follows. Such persons may be infected yet not develop clinical 
manifestations related to the infection.  Were this to apply to John, this would mean 
that there would be no counterparts of the entities labeled #12 and  #13 in Table 3 
except in those circumstances where John had another disease whose symptoms 
mimic those of malaria, in which case a counterpart of #12 would exist. Only if John 
should exhibit a total and irreversible immunity against the morbid effects of the 
parasite – he is an absolute immune carrier – would disposition #11 also not be 
present. In case of partial immunity carriers are able to maintain a state of 
homeostasis: pathological processes that are the realization of disposition #11 still 
come into existence, but the body is able to prevent their clinical manifestation. In this 
case, the CDC seems to entertain the proposition that such patients do not have a 
disease. On the OGMS view, in contrast, John would have the disease, though in a 
dormant form. 
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7   Conclusion 
Have we been able to successfully respond to the challenge? The answer seems to be: 
yes. First, while we follow OGMS in the above in defining ‘disease’ in terms of D6, 
we note that an alternative analysis could be formulated in BFO terms on the basis of 
a definition of ‘disease’ close to that of D7. The latter has the advantage that it is 
favored by many clinicians, but we believe that it faces serious problems in doing 
justice to the wide variations in clinical presentations which are observed for many 
diseases.6 We believe that it faces problems also in doing justice to the interactions 
between disease and treatment. On the OGMS view, a disease that is being 
successfully treated with symptom-suppressant drugs remains one and the same 
disease, though the disease course is here radically modified.   
If the disease of malaria is, as according to D6, a disposition, then we need to 
determine which of the three dispositions #4, #9 or #11 – or perhaps which 
combination of these three dispositions – is most appropriately called ‘malaria’. If, as 
according to D1 and the CDC, #11 is chosen, then #4 and #9 come to be recognized 
as predispositions to malaria, following D11. It then still remains open whether they 
themselves are properly to be classified also as diseases in their own right. 
Whichever decision is taken, it is in each case possible to determine whether or not 
John has malaria under the chosen definition, and if so, when he has the disease. We 
demonstrate this in Table 4 by inspecting three cases: a standard case, a case in which 
a person is a carrier but has developed total immunity, and a case in which this 
immunity is only partial.  
The question whether, under the distinguished scenarios and definitions, a correct 
diagnosis can be made depends of course on what at any given time is known about 
John. If for instance D6 as exemplified by #9 is chosen as definition for ‘malaria’, and 
if it is not known that John is totally immune, then the blood smear evidence will 
likely lead to an incorrect diagnosis to the effect that John has the disease. The 
additional challenge, i.e. to ‘classify an immature life form as a cause of a disease 
when the causative agent develops internally to the organism and changes its stage of 
life’, is hereby also met. The causal relationship between the immature life form – the 
sporozoites – and the occurrence of clinical manifestations is clearly demonstrated by 
at least the following chain of relationships:  
 
 #1 has-part #3 at t2-t3  (rel 5) 
 #3 derivational-source-of #7 at t2 (rel 14) 
 #7 derivational-source-of #10 at t6 (rel 21) 
 #10 bearer-of #11 at t6  (rel 24) 
 #11 realizes #13 at t7  (rel 27) 
 
Table 4: Specification of the time when John has malaria under three possible definitions and 
three case types. 
 Definition for ‘malaria’ based on D6 
exemplified by  
Case type #4 #9 #11 
standard  t2-t3 t5-t7 t6-t7 
absolute immune carrier t2-t3 - t6 
partial immunity t2-t3 t5-t7 t6-t7 
 
 
It is an open question whether these same challenges can also be met by standard 
information-modeling approaches to the representation of clinical scenarios 
illustrated, for example, by the HL7 RIM.  
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